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$$4 \sin^2 \frac{1}{2} \phi = (r + r' + \delta)/a \text{ and } 4 \sin^2 \frac{1}{2} \phi = (r + r' - \delta)/a.$$

EULER'S THEOREM :

By VII,  $h^2 = 2a\mu$ ; and the area described  $= ht = \sqrt{2a\mu}t$ ; hence

$$t = y(x + 3a)/3\sqrt{2a\mu} = 2\sqrt{x}(x + 3a)/3\sqrt{2\mu};$$

and, assuming  $\lambda^2 = z + y$ , and  $\mu^2 = z - y$ , we have

$$2(a + x) = 2z = \lambda^2 + \mu^2$$

$$2(a - x) = 2\sqrt{(z^2 - y^2)} = 2\lambda\mu.$$

Therefore,  $2\sqrt{x} = \lambda - \mu$ ,  $x + 3a = \lambda^2 + \lambda\mu + \mu^2$

$$\text{and } t = (\lambda^3 - \mu^3)/3\sqrt{2\mu}.$$

Now,  $t$ ,  $z$ , or  $\frac{1}{2}(r + r')$ ,  $y$  or  $\frac{1}{2}\delta$ , and therefore  $\lambda$  and  $\mu$ , are all invariable; hence, in general, since area equals  $\sqrt{2a\mu}t$ , we have

$$\text{Area of parabolic sector} = \sqrt{a}(\lambda^3 - \mu^3)/3,$$

where  $2\lambda^2 = r + r' + \delta$ , and  $2\mu^2 = r + r' - \delta$ .

*Note.* The sign of  $\mu$  changes when PQ cuts AS produced.

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### MONISM AND THE ANTINOMIES.

In the following sketch it is the purpose of the author to offer a few brief suggestions with a view to clearing up some of the long-mooted problems of philosophy and theology, particularly in regard to the so-called philosophical antinomies. Of these Kant has enumerated four, viz., (1) whether the universe is temporal and finite, or eternal and infinite; (2) whether composite substances are capable of resolution into irresolvable simple parts, or whether "naught that is simple exists"; (3) whether causality is the sole cause of phenomena or whether free will must be considered along with it; and (4) whether the world (i. e., the sum-totality of existence) possesses or does not possess some form of necessary existence. The contention of Kant is that these paradoxes do not exist, save in our own thought, and that it is due to the limitation of our mental powers that we seem to see such antinomies. With regard to the most important of these, namely, whether causality is the sole cause of existence, he has demonstrated absolutely, and with

consummate skill, the perfect compatibility of inexorable necessity with free will; and while it would appear that he has not demonstrated conclusively the existence of free will in itself, yet he gives the latter a presumptive status so strong that we are practically obliged to admit that it is part and parcel of the scheme of things and must therefore be considered at length in all serious philosophical inquiry.

To these metaphysical antinomies of Kant there must be added the theological antinomies of Mansel, which we cannot better set forth than by quoting the following from Mansel, as given in Spencer's *First Principles* (p. 35) :

"How . . . can Infinite Power be able to do all things, and yet Infinite Goodness be unable to do evil? How can Infinite Justice exact the utmost penalty for every sin, and yet Infinite Mercy pardon the sinner? How can Infinite Freedom be at liberty to do or to forbear? How is the existence of Evil compatible with that of an infinitely perfect Being; for if he wills it, he is not infinitely good; and if he wills it not, his will is thwarted, and his sphere of action limited?"

All of these, it will be seen at a glance, have to do directly with the antinomy of free will. Besides, their pragmatic interest is of highest importance; and, being apparently in direct paradox to the doctrine of monism, which maintains the essential oneness and unity of everything, they must receive more detailed consideration here.

The first two antinomies of Kant, relating to the infinitude of the universe and to its complexity, have little direct bearing on monism, as far as our purposes are concerned, since it is necessary that all parts of an entirety, whether finite or infinite, or whether capable of resolution into simple parts, or incapable of such analysis, must bear certain unalterable relations to one another, since that is what the concept of entirety implies.

His third antinomy offers greater difficulty. If causality were the sole cause of everything, it would be necessary that monism should obtain. On the other hand, if causality is not the sole cause, but free will must be considered along with it, then even if free will can only modify things spontaneously along the lines or within the bounds which necessity prescribes, a higher law must be shown to exist, or at least its possibility must be shown to be reasonable, as an intellectual conception, before we can include it (i. e., free will) alongside of causality in a complete body of monistic doctrine.

Here we will add, as giving an important side-light on this

question, that due regard must be paid to the general consensus of human kind, to the effect that there is an essential moral element in a certain class of actions (lying within the scope of ethics)—a conception which thousands of years of philosophical thought and dispute have failed to shake.

The notion of a spontaneous cause, infinite in its operation and in its scope of activity, is not difficult to form; and the presumptive evidence which militates so strongly in favor of the doctrine of free will in human agents, must carry with it, as a necessary corollary, the doctrine of a freedom, not finite as with man, but absolutely infinite.

That such an infinite freedom must be rational, goes without saying. For an infinite being, omnipotent and omniscient, to err, even in a moral sense, were an utter absurdity. We should, therefore, presumptively ascribe to this infinite freedom a higher law of freedom, transcending all concept of natural law, just as the concept of infinite freedom, on the other hand, transcends all our ideas of the limited freedom possessed by man. In addition, we must not think of natural law as a limitation upon the infinite, but as part and parcel—an integral portion so to speak—of its higher law of liberty. And this higher liberty of the infinite is to be considered, theologically, as the goal which the regenerated human soul ever strives to attain through an infinite series of spiritual progressions.

The difficulty in regard to the inability of the absolute, infinitely good, to do evil, must be regarded in the light of an inscrutable problem. Of course, it is only moral evil of which we here speak. To infer that since God created man, and man sins, God must be the author of evil, were well-nigh blasphemous. Man attains the privilege of grace only by the exercise of his divine prerogative of freedom, and whenever he abuses it *he* becomes the author of evil.

The reconciliation of infinite justice with infinite mercy should be an easy matter. It is not reasonable to suppose that the justified sinner escapes the natural penalty of his sins, but rather that he escapes the added penalty that would be inflicted for his continuance in the way of evil. Justification when used in a theological sense means exactly what that word naturally implies,—that the saved sinner is justified, because in the agony of his contrition and in the diminished possibilities of future happiness which he has already incurred, he has, at the moment of conversion, paid the full

penalty for his sins. The exercise of the divine prerogative of mercy is thoroughly at one with the higher law of absolute freedom.

"How can Infinite Freedom be at liberty to do or to forbear?" Because it is *Infinite Freedom*.

And as to the existence of moral evil being a limitation of the freedom of the absolute, as some one has well said, "a self-imposed limitation is no limitation at all," and we might add that God, in sharing his prerogative of freedom with man, diminishes his own limitation not one whit, because what is infinite in the first instance is incapable of diminution.

The conclusion to be arrived at from a more detailed consideration of this theme is as follows: That the universe of material things and forces is a totality, but not the totality of all existence; that the freedom of man is consistent through and through with the universality of natural law; that the existence of an absolute being is in no way incompatible with the existence of other entities, of a finite character; and lastly, that the sum total of material things and forces, of man and his actions, of mind and its thoughts, of freedom and its prerogatives and privileges, each and every one of them, together with the absolute, are woven together, as it were, in conformity with a higher law transcending all natural law,—all in a comprehensive, necessary, consistent and perfect monistic scheme of existence.

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#### KANT'S ANTINOMIES AND THEIR SOLUTION.

Kant's antinomies have proved a puzzle to thinkers. The great author of the *Critique of Pure Reason* believes that there are some statements concerning which the affirmative and the negative can be defended with equally valid proof and logically correct arguments. But these four double statements present each two contradictory affirmations of which only one side can be right; or if both are right they must be affirmed according to the sense which we attach to the words or as we interpret the meaning of the proposition. Antinomies are contradictory, and, according to Kant, they express a deeper truth than reason can fathom, the word being derived from *anti* (in the sense of "contrary") and *nomos* (law).